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Abstract
The absence of compassion, argues the author, is not the cause of healthcare failures but rather a symptom of 
deeper systemic failures. The clinical encounter arouses strong emotions of anxiety, fear, and anger in patients 
which are often projected onto the clinicians. Attempts to protect clinicians through various bureaucratic devices 
and depersonalization of the patient, constitute as Menzies noted in her classic work, social defences, aimed at 
containing the anxieties of clinicians but ending up in reinforcing these anxieties. Instead of placing additional 
burdens on clinicians by bureaucratizing and benchmarking compassion, the author argues that proper emotional 
management and support is a precondition for a healthcare system that offers humane and effective treatment to 
patients and a humane working environment for those who work in it. 
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A compassion deficit has recently been identified as an explanation for some major healthcare scandals and failures, as Marianna Fotaki1 has eloquently argued 
in her recent editorial. This, as she states, is reflected in the 
findings of public inquiries into such failings, but it also 
expresses public opinion on the causes of these failings. A 
compassion deficit as the core reason for healthcare failures 
is also currently beginning to infiltrate academic discussions. 
The combination of the terms ‘compassion’ and ‘healthcare’ 
resulted in only two articles on the ISI Web of Knowledge 
database in the early years of the twenty first century, a figure 
that rose to 23 in 2014. Compassion and its failings then are 
now centre stage in public discussions of health policy and 
increasingly academic discussions too. 
At first sight, the plausibility of the idea that failures in 
healthcare are due to lack of compassion of clinicians for their 
patients seems incontestable. This is certainly the view of many 
patients and their relatives, but also many of those working 
in the health sector. Notice something else too – in public 
discussions nurses seem to be instantly placed in one of two 
extreme positions, either idealized as caring angels or vilified 
as uncaring functionaries filling forms and holding back 
from offering patients the one thing they desperately need: 
reassurance and human contact. This tendency to idealize or 
to vilify extends to doctors (messianic figures saving lives or 
uncaring technicians treating patients as throughput to their 
medical machines). It also extends to the National Health 
Service (NHS) system as a whole, where, at least in the United 
Kingdom it is portrayed as the nation’s greatest institution, 
or conversely, as a Kafkaesque bureaucracy which people 
enter at a huge risk to their dignity, their humanity and even 
their health.
It is worth reflecting on the centrality of compassion in 
different service relations, in other words in relations when a 
system staffed by professionals seeks to address the needs of 
its constituents or clients. Do patients need or deserve more 
compassion from those who serve them than do students or 
airline passengers? Do patients deserve more compassion 
than the compassion that nurses or doctors who look after 
them deserve from their own managers or the public at large? 
Emotion is central to every service relation, whether it 
involves clinical work, nursery work, teaching or even 
hairdressing. In all of these instances, people place themselves 
in a dependent relation to someone with superior expertise 
and are liable to feel vulnerable, exposed and anxious. As 
Fotaki rightly points out, a duty of care, is the corollary of 
this vulnerability: the undertaking, in other words, to provide 
an effective and safe service, but also to treat the other with 
respect and consideration. A safe and effective service, ie, a 
technically effective service that minimizes health risks and 
optimizes a patient’s chances of survival and recovery, is 
not enough, unless it is complemented by a concern for the 
patient’s psychological well-being in time of vulnerability and 
anxiety. 
This is why ‘emotional labour’ becomes as important in the 
way clinical staff do their work as intellectual and manual 
labour. Emotional labour is a term proposed by Hochschild2 
and subsequently used numerous theorists to denote the 
work involved in responding to the emotional needs of 
clients in different service transactions. In the case of health 
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service, reading the emotions of patients and their loved 
ones, responding to them and managing them becomes as 
important as drawing blood with syringes or performing 
mastectomies. However, working with patients’ potentially 
explosive emotions (including fear, anger, despair, anxiety, 
disappointment, and physical pain) makes considerable 
demands on those who deliver the service, demands that 
are reduced if the clinical staff distance themselves from 
the patients and restrict themselves to providing a safe and 
efficient technical service. Hochschild2 was aware that in 
some circumstances emotional labour can turn into the 
‘commercialization of human feeling,’ where employees go 
through the motions of displaying suitable emotions, such 
as compassion, excitement or hope, without actually feeling 
them, a situation she described as ‘surface acting.’ This would 
certainly result in deficit of real compassion even if the 
pretence of compassion is displayed in a healthcare setting. 
What Hochschild’s important concept did not consider is that 
emotional labour towards others requires a very considerable 
work on the part of health and other service providers with 
their own emotions. This is what Ian Craib, in a seminal 
contribution, described as emotional work:
“Individuals, people – men and women – are by definition 
engaged in at least two interlocking forms of emotional 
work: The ‘internal’ work of coping with contradiction, 
conflict and ambivalence and the ‘external’ work of 
reconciling what goes on inside with what one is ‘supposed’ 
or ‘allowed’ to feel” (p. 113).3
The internal emotion work carried out by professionals like 
nurses and doctors who deal with people in acute distress or 
anxiety is an issue that rarely receives the attention it merits. 
Under a ‘stiff upper lip’ ethic, a professional ethic of cool 
efficiency consigns the emotional complexities of dealing 
with another’s suffering to the margins – something that any 
experienced professional should automatically know how 
to do. 
In nursing literature, the importance of ‘external emotional 
work’ continues to be the topic of vigorous debates, gauging 
the relative importance of clinical and professional skills as 
against emotional attributes.4-8 These debates touch a much 
broader audience than academics, as exemplified by the 
widely reported sermon in 2006 of the then Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams (http://rowanwilliams.
archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1488/nursing-
dignity-and-florence-nightingale-sermon-at-westminster-
abbey). 
You could say that the modern profession of nursing was born out 
of a passion for human dignity - not just the sense of a practical 
job to be done, but a serious conviction that what is due to people 
in situations where they are helpless and even dying is time, 
respect and patience, no less than practical skill.… Specifically 
in the health care professions, a growing number of people now 
say that the simply personal and relational skills of healing are 
squeezed out in training and seriously undervalued in favour of 
mechanistic skills. And for nurses especially, this is a huge and 
damaging shift away from that fundamental commitment to the 
service of human dignity with which we began. 
An author who was way ahead of her time in discussing the 
emotional demands of nursing work was Isabel Menzies. 
Based on research in a London teaching hospital, her study “A 
case study in functioning of social systems as a defence against 
anxiety”9 can rightly claim to be a classic. Nurses, argued 
Menzies, operate in an emotional maelstrom of demands and 
expectations made by patients and their relatives. These include 
both positive and negative emotions, ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ 
ones, ranging from gratitude, respect and admiration to 
envy, resentment, contempt and rage. In addition, nurses 
experienced profound and conflicting feelings of their own 
towards their patients, including closeness and personal 
caring, but also impatience, frustration and anger. These 
emotions are compounded by an awareness that mistakes can 
be very costly, that their patients may die or that they may be 
powerless to control their fear, panic and anger. 
“The work situation arouses very strong and mixed feelings 
in the nurse: pity, compassion and love; guilt and anxiety; 
hatred and resentment of patients who arouse these strong 
feelings; envy of the care given to the patient” ( p. 46).10 
Faced with such an emotional cauldron, many nurses are 
prone to feel primitive anxieties whose origins, in Kleinian 
theory, can be traced in the experiences that we all have as 
children. According to Klein,11 every infant experiences a 
tremendous rage when they first discover that their mother 
is not there to care for them. They respond to this absence 
by ‘splitting’ the mother into two separate objects, the ‘good 
mother’ and the ‘bad mother’ and the maternal breast into 
two separate breasts, the idealized ‘good breast’ that is the 
source of life and the ‘bad breast’ that threatens life. 
Such anxieties are liable to resurface later in life when we 
experience life or death situations that precipitate splitting 
– precisely what often happens in clinical encounters 
when the clinician is liable to split the patient into a ‘good 
patient’ (obedient, pliable, and grateful) and a ‘bad patient’ 
(demanding, self-centered, and ungrateful) and the patient is 
liable to split the clinician into a ‘good nurse (or doctor)’ (life-
giving, caring, and wise) and a ‘bad nurse’ (withdrawing, cold, 
and indifferent). Nurses cast in the role of the ‘bad nurse’ or 
believing themselves to be cast in this role are then liable to 
experience intense (and at times unbearable) anxieties from 
which they seek to defend themselves by looking at patients 
as bed-blockers (people who stay too long in hospital because 
there is nowhere else for them to go), parasites or worse. 
Menzies decisive contribution, and what makes her work 
very relevant to contemporary discussions on compassion, 
was to establish how an organization’s own bureaucratic 
features, its rules and procedures, rotas, task-lists, checks 
and box-ticking, paperwork, hierarchies, and so on, all of 
these impersonal devices act as supports for the defensive 
techniques. By allowing for ‘ritual task performance,’ 
by depersonalizing relations with the patients, by using 
organizational hierarchies, nurses contain their anxiety. Thus 
a patient becomes ‘the kidney in bed 14’ or ‘the tracheotomy 
in ward B.’ In this way, nurses limit the anxiety they would 
experience if each patient were to be dealt as a full human 
being in need. And remember – Menzies was writing this in 
the 1950s and 1960s, a time that is now presented as a golden 
age of the NHS for its caring qualities. This is a point repeated 
many years later by Bauman12 in his adiaphorization thesis 
– the pronounced ability of bureaucratic organizations to 
emasculate individuals’ moral impulse and to neutralize their 
sense of moral responsibility, thus eliminating their capacity 
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for compassion. 
Now comes Menzies’s decisive contribution and the one 
that puts her ahead of others theorizing how bureaucratic 
organization neutralize their employees’ moral impulse. 
Organizational defences against anxiety not only dehumanize 
the patient but are ultimately ineffective in protecting the 
clinician.
“The system made little provision for confronting anxiety 
and working it through, the only way in which a real 
increase in the capacity to cope with it and personal 
maturation would take place. As a social defence system, it 
was ineffectual in containing anxiety” (p. 363).13 
The system’s inadequacy is evidenced by its failure to train and 
retain nurses, low morale, high levels of stress and burn-out, 
and absence of work satisfaction. By contrast, institutional 
health is testified not only by performance and output 
indicators, but also by morale indicators, and individual 
feelings of fulfilment from performing an invaluable service. 
Along with other psychoanalytically trained theorists, 
Menzies believed that skilful organizational consultants can 
restore an organization to health, by implementing a number 
of principles:
These principles match quite closely the criteria for a healthy 
personality as derived from psychoanalysis. They include 
avoiding dealing with anxiety by the use of regressed defenses; 
more uses of adaptations and sublimation; the ability to confront 
and work through problems; opportunities for people to deploy 
their capacities to their fullest, no more or less than they are 
able to do; opportunity to operate realistic control over their 
life in the institution while being able to take due account of the 
needs and contributions of others; independence without undue 
supervision; and visible relation between efforts and rewards, not 
only financial (p. 373).13
As we have noted, in highlighting the importance of working 
with the turbulent emotions unleashed by clinical encounters, 
Menzies was well ahead of her time. On the basis of research 
in four London teaching hospitals, Lökman and colleagues14 
have demonstrated that the emotional dynamics and 
depersonalization of patients that afflict nurses also afflict 
doctors. Other theorists, like Obholzer and Roberts,15,16 
Fotaki17 and Gabriel18,19 have built on Menzies’ legacy 
demonstrating why not just nurses but entire health systems 
become charged with unrealistic expectations for miracles, 
health and even immortality, which generate immense 
anxieties for their own staff. Unless we develop ways of 
containing these anxieties without denying them or viewing 
them as indicators of weakness and failure, health workers 
will continue to be confronted with impossible and damaging 
demands.
Seeking to promote compassion by sermonizing, scapegoating 
and box-ticking will only have the opposite result – it will 
enhance feelings of guilt, anxiety, and resentment, resulting in 
superficial displays of compassion accompanied by defensive 
and regressive positions which ultimately do no good to the 
patients, to clinicians or to the system. This is not to deny the 
importance of compassion emerging for an organizational 
ethos of caring, as advocated by Fotaki in her editorial. Such 
genuine compassion can only result from the containment of 
anxieties, the moderation of the expectation of miracles, the 
acknowledgement of vulnerability and suffering and, above 
all, a continuing endeavour to bring painful emotions to the 
surface rather than seek to obliterate and deny them. These 
seem to me to be the preconditions for a healthcare system 
that is able to learn from mistakes without a blame culture 
and able to sustain a humane and caring service.
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